T H E COMMON EL EM ENTS
It is by now a truism that a ll form s of therapy in vol ve supportive e lements, and that th ese aspects pla ya r ol e in th e success of t herapy (6) . We kn ow that Freud fed herrin g to the Rat Ma n, a nd tha t th is feeding , as well as the Ra t Man 's fa mi liar ity with Freud's fa mi ly, pla yed a role in h is cu re (7) . Both th ese aspects are viewed as a berrations of wh at h as now becom e Freud ian techniq ue , even though Freud viol at ed it. Koh ut also recog ni zed the need for support ive empath y to bolster the se lf-es teem of Mr. Z, who h ad fai led to improv e from a cou rse of more tradition al the rapy (8) .
A lt hough su pportive therapy e mbodies tradit io ns of co u nse ling a nd adv ice
J EFF ER SO N JO UR N A L OF PSYCHIATRY
whic h go ba ck to anc ie n t times, its fir st clear-cut form u lations were made by A lexa nder and French (9) and by Gill (10) . Gill was o ne of t he fir st to reco gnize that th e usual interpr etation of d efenses cou ld no t be a pplied to patients with lo w ego st rength, who ris ked regress ion and co u ld not ha ndle th e anxiety. From th is starting po int, a lbeit slow ly, t he co ncep t of sup portive therapy as an ego-b uild ing or sel f-esteem en hanci ng therapy was elabora ted in the ens u ing years b y Al exander ( 11) , Goldman ( 12) , DeWald (13) , and o t hers . More recently, it has been the su bject of a maj or review (14) and a n entire issue of Psychiatric An na ls ( 15 , 16, 17, 18) . On a n alternative track , su pportive th erapy a lso beca me widely used as a techn iqu e for counseling "psychologically health y" patients in crisis (medical illn ess, disaster, bereavement) as well as "unhealthy" patients in crisis (e.g., a d ysth ymic patient who attempts suicide). Most therapist s have ha d occasion to sh ift modes from insight-oriented therapy to supporti ve t hera py at the time of so me intercurrent cr isis. This use of supportive therapy is con tinuous with its application as a long-term treatment.
Supportive therapy is often contrasted with psych oanal ysis and psych od ynamic ps ychotherapy. Although th ere are many differences between the latter two , for our purposes we will lump them together as examp les of what we shall ca ll psychodynamic therapy. Psychodynamic th erapy is a means of u nco ver ing co nflict and using interpretation and insight to foster personali ty change.
There is substan t ial agreement among practitioners o n th e general characteri stics of the two types of therapies (14,15 ,18,19) . In ge nera l, the psychodynamic therapist develops an anonymous, neutral , abstainin g relationship with th e patient in order to achieve the goals of long-term characterolog ical change, r esolution of infantile neurosis, a weakening of d ysfuncti o na l d efe nses and an expansio n of ego functions ac cording to Freud's di ctum th at "where id was , there ego sha ll be " (20) . To those ends, the th erapist may encou rage free asso cia t io ns and fantasy in the patient and an intense transferential relationship.
By contrast, the supportive therapist fos ters a more act ive a nd d ir ective relationship, promoting a po sitive, but limited transference and so me d egr ee of d ependency. The goals of such therapy are symptom and behavioral control, or restoration and maintenance of the patient's function ing, and it reaches those goals through support of th e patient's ego function s and streng then ing of ad ap tive defenses and coping behaviors.
PATIENT SELECTION
H ow do patient cha racter ist ics govern the cho ice o f therapy? T he choice of th e best available therapy is based on the patient's ego d eficits, moti vat io n , impulse co n tro l, and ability to think psychologicall y. Detail ed selection procedures a re provided b y severa l authors (5 ,13 ,21 ) .
Insight-oriented therapy is felt to be e ffective in modifying psych opat holo gy a nd achieving long-term character change in patients wit h substantial ego strength and flex ib ility. A typical such patient is bothered by a co n flict (primarily O ed ipa l), thinks psychologically, has an observing ego, can main tain a verbal relationship and, in general, has now and has had in th e past a supportive environment. He or she can to lerate the stress and anxiety arising from the t herap ist's in terpretatio n beca use he or she has good impulse co ntrol, co n tains affect, obtai ns symptom reli e f b y un derstand ing, an d does not ac t ou t internal conflicts. For a sui ta b le patient, psychodynam ic therapy would produce the most stable and enduring change and would be preferred over su pportive therap y. Its success, however, requires the patient to do much of the ana lytic work h im sel f or hersel f. He or she will have va r io us tas ks, such as working through u n reso lved chi ld hood conflicts b y means of a transference ne u rosis focused on th e th erapist. To perform these tas ks, t he patent must, in general, be cognitivel y intact , in touch with his or her emotions, and enter the therapy with relativel y mature defenses and a reasonab le ego structure.
This engenders what Werman (22) calls the "recognized pa rado x" that psych odynamic th erapy gives t he most benefit to t he most integrat ed indi vid uals . It leaves out those suffering from schizop hrenia, substance abuse , dementia and mental retardation, or in other words the majority of ch ronic men tal patients. Although high ly skilled and dedicated ana lysts have successfu lly tr eated severe psycho patholo gy, an d no particular diagnosis per se rules out a na lysis, these chronically ill patients are usuall y u nabl e to bene fit from insight-orient ed t herapy . They have a low capacity for introspection. They do not psych o logize , but act out their u nco nscio us content or exhibit biologically compell ed beh avio r. They cannot contain negative affect, and exhibit poor obj ect re lations and im pulse control. Their conflicts are p re-Oedi pa l. Their defen ses are prim it ive a nd th ei r ego strength is low. T hey m ay be cognitively impaired. T hey are in danger (often imminent) of h urting themsel ves and others. They have suffered and will continue to suffer u nstabl e relationships. They require th e mo re active and d irected re lat ionship of supportive therapy.
THE TECHN IQUES
Winnicott remarked that " the analysis of a ps ychotic is irksome as co mpared with that ofa neurotic, and inherently so" (23) . Similarly, a th erapi st tra ined in interpretive techniques may in itiall y find supportive thera py frustrating. Understand ing th e pat ient is often thwarted b y perso nal and social differen ces from t he therapist, who ha s not ex perienced the d isor gan izat io n and d et eriorati o n of chronic mental illness and ma y be unable to relate empathically to its victi m s.
For these reaso ns, supportive therapy is actuall y a considera bly more comp lex underta king t han psychod ynam ic therapy. It requires th e same understanding of the pa tient's psych opath olo gy, e.g., hi s or her ch aracter struc ture and d e fe nses, as the therapist strives for in psychodynamic th erap y, yet the interventions are of broader ra nge , encompassing, at times, th e interpret at io ns o f analysis, but also a host of suggestions, gratifications and direct ives which have to be carefully chosen as to timing, wording, and calculated impact. Wa llace (24) refers to the debate in the therapist's mind over confronting o r supporting a defense, or gratifying a request instead of analyzing it. These questi o ns d o not usually arise for the analyst, although they can create a " m o ral str uggle " in th e psychodynamic therapist, who may worry that these are deviations in technique. Eissler has called these deviations "parameters" which must b e justified and later analyzed away (25) . In supportive therapy, however, they may b e ke y components of strategy.
We can divide the techniques of supportive therapy into two kinds. First, there are modifications of psychoanalytic or psychodynamic techniques. Second , there are those techniques that are specifically supportive. Psych oana lyt ically derived techniques include the formulation and giving of interpretations, th e specific fostering of transference, and dream analysis. All ha ve rec eived significant attention in the literature of supportive therapy.
For example, Werman (5) explains how intellectualizing a n d ra tio nal izin g interpretations may be offered to diminish guilt or provide defenses against anxiety. Upward interpretations are used frequentl y, ev en o f hallucina tio ns. Pine offers four concise rules for speaking interpretively in the sup portive context (17) . These are, slightly rephrased, as follows:
1. Control or limit the patient's associations to interpretations. 2. Strike while the iron is cold (that is, when the patient's e motio ns ha ve cooled about the situation interpreted). 3. Involve the patient actively in the interpretation. 4. Increase the "holding" aspects of the therapeutic environment.
These rules seem to be common sense, given the patient's presumed difficulties in tolerating the anxiety that would be evoked by more psychodynamic interpretations. With a similar sensitivity to the patient's ego deficits , Werman has concluded that it is, again, a matter of knowing what not to say , that is, avoiding regressive interpretations in favor of interpreting upwards. H e recounts a schizophrenic patient's dream of beating the neighbor's d og . The therapist interprets the displaced anger as permissible and suggests th at th e patient will not turn it into action (26) . More regressive interpretations (e. g ., t hat the dream refers to masturbation) are to be avoided. The therapist adapts to th e patient's ego structure by choosing interpretations based on the patient's r ead iness to accept or assimilate them. Thus, upward interpretation may be best suited for the patient who cannot tolerate sexual anxiety (e .g ., a paran o id patient) .
In addition to modified psychoanalytic techniques, there a r e special techniques which are primarily supportive. These include advice, suggestion , expressions of concern, reassurance, encouragement, teaching, education, a n d gu idance. More elaborate strategies, such as the psychodynamic life narrative (27 ) and reference to the "good" and "bad" parts of the patient (28), ha ve al so bee n developed. All are employed in the service of improving the patient's r eality-testing, coping abilities, and impulse control. Regarding the latter, Wall e rste in 's characterization of su pportive therapy as suppressive is especi all y a pt. Werman similarly counsels patients to suppress the thought processes th a t lead to "unhandleable " anxiety and recommends that patients b e tau ght to rehearse specific intellectual formulations to deal with frightening o r d epressin g situations (5) . He considers this technique to be derived from beha vior modificat io n , "which in general should be considered in supportive therapy whe n dee med appropriate" (22) .
Other specifically supportive techniques include the st rengthening of defenses (as opposed to their weakening through interpretation) a nd th e use of the therapist as an (un interpreted) role model or mentor (for e xa m p le, to show the patient it is not necessary to act immediately on impulses). Both of these examples touch upon how the therapist acts and relates to the patien t. Psych oanalytic therapists writing a bout such techniques have varied in their criteria for admissibility in to therapy. Greenson, for example, allows a lim ited role for abreaction , suggestion , and even manipulation, but condemns the "deliberate and conscious assumption of roles or attitudes" because "it creates a n unanalyzable situation" (29) . However, an unanalyzable situation in sup portive therapy is not intolerable and may be preferable.
Su llivan considers three other techniques from a learning th eory perspective (30) . These are:
(1) expressions of interest and solicitude, (2) giv ing advice, and (3) ventilation Though these are included among supportive techniques, h e shows ho w each can be misapplied by mis understanding the nature of the behavioral co nditioning. First, sporadic or random expressions of concern are a str o ng reward which might have the unintended effect of sim p ly reinforcing the patie nt 's repetitive verbalization of p roblems wit hout making constructive progress. Second , advice is often eschewed by psychiatrists as overly directive, but may also be effective because it reinforces desired behaviors. Sullivan's simple e xa m p le o f suggesting to the pa tient that he get a d o g , shows how directive advice can be quite specific. Can such advice-g iving backfire? Of course, but so can non-dir ective inte r ventions. Third, venti lation of feeling per se can be dangerous and is in fact often opposed to another technique, control of affect. What is important is ventilation in a supportive setting so as to gain a sense of mastery. As Sullivan notes, the mere ventilation of negative feelings, e .g ., in a ward meeting, may rei n fo rce low morale and perpetuate the externalization of blame for the patient 's p r obl e ms.
DANGERS AND OBJECTIONS
It is obvious that in the supportive relationship there are in herent d an ge rs to both patient and therapist. Dangers to the patient include depe ndency on the therapist and loss of autonomy. Dangers to the therapist include h is or her willful or unwitting imposition of va lues on the patient and the use of the rea l rel at io nsh ip with the patient for narcissistic gratification, grandiosity, and power, or the misuse of the relationship as a non-therapeutic fri endshi p . The latter is th e dynamic which in the e xtre me can become sexual mi sconduct.
It is no accident that the " go ld sta nd ar d" of a benign, but non-interfering, th erapist is held in most quarters, because it represents the view that more directive interventions are wrong in some sense . Langs, for example, wh o sanctions the therapist's intervention in cases of acting o u t o r ac u te regression , goes on to severely limit supportive interventions. Hi s general objections are that they may represent (1) countertransference problems, (2) th eo retica l misunderstandings, or (3) misguided techniques.
Langs gives a vignette in which the therapist, for var ious reasons, counseled his character-disordered male patient to stop sharing a bedroom with h is mother because of the correct realization that this promoted incestuous fantasies about her which were, in turn, defended against by homosexual fantasies . T he re percussions of this apparently well meant and justified advice we re ma ni fo ld (31) . The patient believed that the therapist was telling him to give up wo men and that the therapist wanted him for himself. He was fu rther afr aid that th e therapist was trying to play God and this frightened th e patient beca use of his dependency on the therapist. Langs generalizes that advice is d angerous for th e reaso ns which are summarized as follows:
1. Advice usually results in mistrust, resistance , and suspic io n . It is dangerous to the therapeutic alliance. 2. Advice fosters dependency and sub m issive ness and infan tilizes the patient. A patient's fear of going mad or losing control of his or her impulses is increased by the therapist's implication that he or she needs restraint or direction. Giving advice, therefore, is a n xie ty-p rovoking, o r else provokes rage at the therapist or desires fo r revenge . 3. Moreover, it deprives the patient of the opportun ity of wo r king o ut hi s or her own intrapsychic conflicts, which may ac tua lly wea ke n, no t strengthen, the patient's defenses. 4. Advice is viewed as an intrusion on the patient's au to nomy, or more primitively, on his or her body, even as a sed uct io n or homosexu al assault. 5. Advice is a mode of interference which has been pract iced on th e patient by his or her family, and may increase nega ti ve transference. In addition , it violates th e patient's rights. 6. Any advice creates risks, since the th erapist's adv ice is ba sed on incomplete information and could be wrong. " Such a stance," says Langs, " is almost never necessary or justified." 7. If the patient sto ps one fo rm o f acting o u t o n th e th erapist 's advice, he or she will replace it with ano ther .
The fo llowing case vignettes illustrate th e co mp lex it ies of managing a sup po r tive relationship, especia lly when the therapist has a dua l ro le vis-a-vis th e patient (Case 1) or is working with a case manager who ha s a differe nt role (Cases 2 and 3). Case 1. A 37-year-old man with a history of sch izophr enia and man y hospitalizations is seen in weekly therapy. After a yea r , th e thera pist feels he ha s developed sufficient rapport and understanding so that he ca n more acti ve ly direct t he improvement of his patient's life. On one occasion th e patient ask s to be admitted to the hospital , but the therapist, after assessin g t he situation , co unsels h im to stay o ut. Later, the therapist finds ou t th at th e patient was actively hallucinating at the time of the request, but did not tell the therapist. T he therapist encourages the pa t ient to get his driver's license , to appl y for j obs, and to socialize in clu bs . O ne day t he patient's mother is hospi tali zed for an illness, bu t th e patien t d o es not ca ll the t herapist despite th e urgings of the fami ly. T he patient says to his fam ily, " Dr. X won't let me go to th e hosp ital. There's no use in ask ing." T hat week the patient dies of an apparent overdose of h is antipsychotic medication.
Case 2. A fami ly which has been seen frequently b y a case manage r for a year is engaged in fami ly therapy . T he 22-year-old daughter admits to the new therapist on the second visit that she is heavily into cocaine , but says she won't te ll her case manage r because the latter thinks too highl y of her.
Case 3. A 24-year-old borderline patient avoids seeing h is case manager every time he suffers a setback at work because hi s ca se manager calls it "self-d efea ting behavior." However, this patient ha s a se parate therapist, who tell s him, "I want to see yo u when things are going badly, no t just when they are going well ." Case 4 . A 42-year-old schizophrenic patient who ca n bec ome catatonic at times tells h is therapist that the latter is becoming " too pu sh y" when the therapist urges that he develop a hobby such as study ing th e plan ts on the hospital grounds. "It's too much of a burden," sa ys th e patient, "and it 's not yo ur job to tell me that."
T he d iffe ri ng perspectives of case manager and therapi st ca n be help fu l in understanding the patient. The patient can at times be opposit ional and ut ilize defensive splitting an d rational ization. If an error has been co m m itted in these cases, it wo uld be th a t the th erap ist or case ma nager ha s assumed th e role of critical paren t, at least as t he patient perceives it. Rather than n u r turing the patient wit h u ncr iti cal accep tance, one of t he care provid ers ha s re-creat ed an atmosphere of pa ren tal ex pectations which has historically proved damaging to the patient. Indeed , we were warned about th is type of er r o r by Lan gs. In all four cases, one might argue, the role of the therapist sho uld be to understand the patie n t, but not to direct him . This is the role that th e th erapi st in Cas es 2 and 3 tried to assume, which the patient in Case 1 needed a nd th e pati e n t in Case 4 asked for. The complexities of supportive therapy are likel y to lea d to er ro rs, but such difficulties do not constitute a theoretical object ion to th e therapy itself.
Failure in the treatment may be catastrophic, as in Ca se I , bu t one cannot assume that another form of treatment would have worked better.
THE QUESTION OF VALUES
Two ke y elements in supportive therapy are the real r elationship be twee n the therapist and patient and the use of that relationship to m odify o r con tr ol the patient's behavior. Such a situation inevitably raises the quest io n of va lues. The ethical dilemma is not merely that supportive therapy imparts in fo r mation . By comparison, one might note that going to a dietician to impro ve yo ur nutr it io n does not raise a moral question. You may believe and accept the di e t icia n 's advice on trust, and hence the relationship involves an element o f fai th , but presumably you will not be so influenced by the transference as to lo se yo ur independent judgment. For example, you can theoreticall y cr oss-check the information you receive from another source. However, it could be argued that it is not morally all right to be directed in your personality b y a th erapist, becau se the element of reliance is too great and this makes it too dangerous.
Werman addresses this problem in the context of the therapist 's role as auxiliary superego (22) . The patient with a weak superego must be told of the destructiveness of his behavior and the need to explore " more benign and substitutive behaviors." Indeed, one is likely to hear more directive statements than that in supportive therapy, su ch as literal commands to stop usin g d rugs, stop abusing spouse or child, obey the law, or su ggestio ns th at the patient needs to spend money more wisel y or should go out and round up a new se t o f fr iends. The other side of the coin, i.e. , the therapist's attempts to weaken an overly punitive superego, does not seem to raise the same ethical concerns.
The conclusion is unavoidable that the therapist is presenting a set o f cultural values to the patient, even if they are of the most blatantly legalistic kind and are proffered with the most benign intent. Howev er, how much co ncern should this raise? Should the therapist be indifferent to wh ether the patient shows up or takes medicine? Should he be indifferent to the patient's co nst r uctive or destructive behaviors? All involve a consideration of what is best for the patient as well as society and a concomitant notion of individual mental h ealth and social propriety.
In general the psychodynamic therapy model attempts to minimi ze interfe rence with the patient's autonomy to make decisions. The supportive th erap y model takes the view that benevolent direction will be in the patient's a nd /or society's long term interests. Certainly, to the extent that socie ty's interests (e.g., in keeping a potentially dangerous patient from harming others) impi nge o n the patient's autonom y, the latter is compromised. Certainly, to th e e xte n t tha t t he therapist uses direction to keep the patient awa y from undesirable influences such as drugs, there is impingement on choice. Howev er, both mod e ls o f autonomy and benevolence have their merits. These have been exp licated by Beauchamp and McCullough (32 ) in the field of medical e t hics with the genera l guideline t hat one chooses the model to fit the patient's knowledge and competence. If we accept Werman's substitutive concept of suppo rtive the rap y, we must surely intervene in the patient's life. By contrast, one is reminded of the apocryphal story of t he Roge r ia n therapist who comments di spassiona tel y on his patient's suicidal te nd e ncies and finally observes that the patient has jumped out the window. As therapists, we have already taken our sta nd in fa vo r of life and certain conceptions of mental health.
In favor of this, one could argue that the patient wh o accepts supportive therapy has in fact given an implied consent to accept on fa ith th e therapist's influence j ust as in our earlier example we accepted the di etician 's adv ice. This is generally true, although there are so m e involuntary patients rece ivin g supportive therapy who may not fee l th e y have the option to rej ect it.
The ethical issues will require exploration as supportive t herapy receives closer scrutiny as a therapeutic modality, but the greatest d an ge r at this time relates to the other ones mentioned earlier, the danger o f the therap ist misusing the relations hip for personal gratification. It is this d anger, rather than the likelihood of being brainwashed by the mental health system, which faces the patient whose judgment is impaired. The following exa m p les clarify th a t concern, although one might imagine that each could be justified in an ap propriate context.
1.
Telling the patient to leave a religious cult and j oin a n established church, which happens to be the therapist's religion . 2. Arguing exclus ively for a monogamous relationship, or specifically telli ng t he patient to get married or divorced, become heterose xual or homosexual. 3. Counseling either for or against an abortion without th e patie nt being the primary decisio n-ma ke r. 4 . Accepting a significant gift from the patient. 5. Accepting unremunerated personal service s from th e pati ent such as baby-sit ti n g or errands to the store.
A fr iend co u ld do all of these things, but it is in this area of va lues th a t lies the difference between a friendly therapeutic relationship a nd a n ac tual fr iendship. The t herapist must adhere to specific objectives of the rapy a nd p rese r ve as m uch autonomy as the patient is capable of. Friendship follows a diffe re n t set of ru les : friends are able to impose their advice or opinions, and the y are allowed to gratify their personal needs through the friendship . We must questio n th e actions above a nd determ ine if they have a therapeutic purpose and th e the rap ist is deluding himself or herself about it. Indeed, the first three ex a m p les seem to involve an outright im p ositio n of values wh ich is unacceptable . The last two involve the use of the real relationship between patient a nd therapist, whi ch can be dangerous but m igh t be justified, for example, in the type of therap y de r ived from Mi lton Erickson (33) .
THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE JEFFERSON JO URN A L O F PSYCHIATRY
Only now are we in a position to assess wh ethe r su pportive therapy and psychodynamic th erapy are really diffe rent in kind o r merel y different adaptations of techniques to goals. My conclusion is that su ppor t ive therapy is primarily a behavioral therapy. To draw an ana logy , if yo u want to ca ll psych od ynam ic th erapy a "wa tered d own " ve rsio n of ps ychoanalysis, then you migh t as well call sup po r t ive therapy a watered down ver sio n of purely behavio ral therapy, such as aversive or desensitization therapy. In so m e ways this claim is obv ious, and in so me ways it is not. In Winston 's classification , for example , sup portive therapy includes much of cognitive and behavioral therapy a nd certai nly such specific techniques as assertiveness training and social skills training. This is not to imply that these different types of th erapy are incompatible. There is presumably only one in te rnal psychic structure, ex pressed in behavior, to which all therapies are directed. All therapy, including psych oanalysis, is to a degree behavioral , since the patient knows the therapist o nly t h rough the latter's behavior and th e th erapist in turn modifies th e patient's behavior th rough var io us intervention s. Beyond th is sim p listic simi larity lies a world of dogmatic dispute. Perhaps it will suffice to recognize th at there are polar perspectives , insight-oriented and behavioral , which co rrespond to what philosophers have ca lled the mentalistic and ph ysicali stic perspect ives (34) . Psychoa na lysis and psychodynamic therapy use primarily mentalisti c concep ts, whereas the perspective of supportive therapy is primarily behavioral and hen ce in a langua ge of physical processes. Recognition of th is sho uld d ispel t he notion that su ppo r t ive therapy is an imprecise and implicitly less e ffective application of insight-oriented therapy.
The basic assumption of insight-oriented th erapy is epitomized in the claim th at significant and enduring personality ch ange can be achieved only by ps ychological insight into hitherto unconscious pro cesses and conflicts . From this foll ow various corollaries, such as:
1. Cure requires the internal restructuring of t his conflic t b y accessing it as directly as possible. 2. T he patient must d o th e wor k himsel f, as an int e rnal sort of mental activ ity . 3. The therapist can serve only as a guide to th e patient's work. 4. Long te rm , permanent, characterological change is po ssibl e only with th ese methods. 5. An y other th erapy must have more limited goals. This basic assu m p tio n and its coroll ari es are flawed, not becau se they are wrong, but because they do not tell th e whole sto r y. Co mpare the situation to th e question in ph ysics of whether light is a particle o r a wave. Bot h t heor ies of light are true in a ma croscopic se nse, and on the face of it also ap pear co ntradictory. 1f yo u had asked a physicist one hundred yea rs ago a bo u t the two theories, he would have said that one of them must be false, onl y he did not know which. Today, however, we are better able to explain such macroscopic contrad icti o ns on the basis of microscopic quantum mechanics, and we can say tha t both theories are true in a manner of speaking and the contradiction is only ap pa rent. Similarly, the apparent contradiction between behavioral and insigh t-o ri e n ted methods is probably resolvable to a large extent at a more microscopic level as we understand the relationship of brain, mind, and behavior. Mea nwhile we must do our best with both.
I therefore disagree with the assumption, implicit in many so urces, th at the techniques of supportive therapy are merely the technical modifica tions of ru les of psychodynamic therapy, adapted to the patient's limitations of u nde rstanding, ego strength, or crisis situation. Though supportive therapy employs such techniques when they are called for, it also draws upon a reperto r y of in herently behavioral methods, including the use of modeling, punishment, reward , approval, and praise. It is this behavioral orientation which raises th e troubleso me ethical problems we have discussed above. However, the specter is not so m uch Orwell's, but more like Skinner's portrayal of a communal societ y based o n operant conditioning in Walden Two (35) .
Seen from the behavioral perspective, one ma y call supportive t hera p y a more limited application of insight-oriented therapy. However, one would th e n have to call insight-oriented therapy a more limited application of supportive therapy. In fact, we could represent them on a spectrum. At one e nd is self-analysis; at the other is a Skinner box (e.g., a room where a research su bject is operantly conditioned). At one end of the spectrum, the therapeutic process is entirely mental; at the other, entirely behavioral. Psychoanalysis and insigh toriented therapy reside near the former, while supportive and behaviora l therapy reside near the latter. Of course, in practice all therapy involves some overtly observable behavior and some mental activity which is not cle arl y observable (and may never be). However, we can see that insight-oriented therapy is in no more privileged a position than supportive therapy with resp ect to its underlying theory. If we accept the parity of the two therapies, th en we should abandon any claims that supportive therapy is not psychotherapy (36) and only the patient who draws at the well of his or her personal unconscious is the best patient or doing " rea l" therapy. Preventing a supportive th erapy patient from committing suicide would seem to be a better accomplishment, at least from the behaviorist's perspective, than giving a person insight into hi s un conscious dynamics while he continues to abuse his spouse.
We must overcome the historical bias of viewing mental accomplishmen t or insight as more significant than behavioral accomplishment. U nder the infl uence of this bias, for example, the behavioral treatment of phobias was in itially scoffed at because it was assumed that symptom substitution would occur. Such an attitude is implicit in Langs' objection to advice-giving discuss ed a bove. Yet we must beware whenever theory becomes more important than fact. As one prominent behavioral researcher notes, there is "no solid evid ence " that symp-tom substitution occurs (37) . In supportive therapy, we h a ve fo u nd a rea lm where, due to the patient's ego deficits, behavioral treatments such as advice and support are both necessary and effective.
CONCLUSIONS
Supportive therapy can be characterized as a set of te chnique s for egodeficient or ego-stressed patients. We have seen that there are substantial e t hica l dangers in the delivery of supportive therapy which arise from it s b eha vio r al and directive orientation . There is also an underlying theoretical conflict between the behavioral presumptions of supportive therapy and the mentalist assumptions of psychoanalytic therapy which has led practitioners to impugn t h e pu r it y or methodological correctness of supportive therapy. This co n fl ic t is p a r t of t h e theoretical debate between theories of psychopathology and will n ot b e resolved for some time . Until then, to paraphrase William Jennings B r yan, we should not press the crown of insight down upon the brows of all our patients.
